Property Qubit Count | Basis choice bias delta | Eve basis choice bias delta | Eavesdropping | Eavesdropping rate | Error estimation sampling rate | Biased error estimation | Error tolerance |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

500 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0 | 0.11 |

- Alice sent 500 qubits to Bob with a basis selection bias of 0.5.
- Eve is eavesdropping on the quantum channel at a rate of 0.1 and with a basis selection bias of 0.5. There is an eavesdropper, Eve, listening in on the channel. She intercepts the qubits, randomly measures them in one of the two mentioned bases and thus destroys the originals, and then sends a new batch of qubits corresponding to her measurements and basis choices to Bob. Since Eve can choose the right basis only 50% of the time on averate, about 1/4 of her bits differ from those of Alice.

- The sifting phase started with 500 transmitted qubits and the resulting bit string was reduced to 257 bits.
- 0.514 of Alice's and Bob's chosen measurement bases match. 0.486 of their chosen bases do not match.
- 0.716 of the two parties measured qubits match before sifting and 0.284 of them do not.
- 0.9144 of the two parties measured qubits match after sifting and 0.0856 of them do not.

- Bob informs Alice of the qubits he managed to successfully measure and he appends an authentication tag to his message. Authentication cost in terms of key material: 64
- Bob informs Alice of the bases he has chosen for measuring the qubits and he appends an authentication tag to his message. Authentication cost in terms of key material: 64
- Alice informs Bob of the bases she has chosen for preparing the qubits and she appends an authentication tag to her message. Authentication cost in terms of key material: 64

- Alice and Bob permute their sifted keys in order to flatten the errors across the entire bit string. They then perform the error estimation by comparing a subset of their error-flattened sifted keys.
- An error rate of 0.0784 was estimated using a sample size of 51 given a sampling ratio of 0.2

- Cascade was run 6 rounds in order to correct the errors.
- 18 erroneous bits were detected and corrected.
- 114 bits were leaked in order to correct the errors.
- With an error probability of 0.0874, the Shannon bound for the number of leaked bits is: 89.0, compared to the actual number of leaked bits: 114.

- 64 bits of key material (preshared secret key) were used to authenticate.
- The Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) universal hashing scheme was used for authentication.

- 146 bits were leaked up to this point.
- The key length before running privacy amplification: 206 bits.
- The final key length is: 40 bits.
- The chosen security parameter is: 20.

Property | Value |
---|---|

Initial number of qubits | 500 |

Final key length | 40 |

Estimated error | 0.0784 |

Eavesdropping enabled | 1 |

Eavesdropping rate | 0.1 |

Alice/Bob basis selection bias | 0.5 |

Eve basis selection bias | 0.5 |

Raw key mismatch before error correction | 0.0856 |

Raw key mismatch after error correction | 0 |

Information leakage (Total number of disclosed bits) | 146 |

Overall key cost for authentication | 256 |

Key length before error correction | 206 |

Bit error probability | 0.0874 |

Bits leaked during error correction | 114 |

Shannon bound for leakage | 89 |

Security parameter | 20 |

Choose a simulator based on the properties of QKD that you would like to further investigate, fine-tune the initial parameters and define constraints for each subprotocol and run the simulator.

Each simulation run will present you with a highly detailed set of results covering every step of the protocol, including internal details of every sub-protocol, e.g. sifting, error correction, privacy amplification, etc. along with a summary of statistics.

Most simulation types will create high quality publication ready plots illustrating core properties of QKD and more specifically, those of each run. We can run resource-intensive simulations for you locally upon request.